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NOTES
COMPULSORY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE UNDER
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Probably the greatest tragedy of the depression has been the
devastating scourge of unemployment inflicted upon the labor-
ing populations of the world. Millions' in the United States de-
prived of jobs, have been thrust upon the Federal Government,
which, through its relief funds and public works endeavors, has
formed the last bulwark against starvation. Although there have
been periodical spells of unemployment before in this country,
the extent and duration of the present have brought the prob-
lem of caring for the unemployed to its deserved place among
the most important topics of the day. The awakening social con-
sciousness and the efforts of a progressive administration have
resulted in the formation of a plan for a systematic means of
caring for the unemployed, through the Federal Social Secur-
ity Act of 19352 and the state acts 3 which have been rushed to
passage in consequence thereof.4
Unemployment compensation, for which these Acts provide,
is a means of dealing with the problem of unemployment which,
although untried until recently by federal or state governments
in the United States has been put into effect in a number of for-
eign countries. Great Britain has had a compulsory unemploy-
ment compensation law in effect since 1911 ;r Germany followed
the British lead with a comprehensive law in 1927 ;O and at the
present time at least eight foreign countries besides these have
1. There are no absolutely reliable figures on the number of unemployed
in the United States during the depression. Probably a safe estimate is
15,000,000 at the depth of the depression in 1933 and 9,000,000 at the end
of 1936.
2. 49 Stat. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. sec. 301 et seq. (1935).
3. For state acts passed up to Jan. 1, 1937, see note 15, infra.
4. The Federal Act set December 31, 1936, as the deadline before which
state acts must be approved if they are to qualify under its credit provi-
sions with respect to taxes payable in 1937 (see notes 81 and 82, infra.).
5. For an account of Great Britain's experience with unemployment in-
surance, see Douglas and Director, The Problem of Unemployment (1931)
401-426; Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (1930) 253-
294; Abbott, The Social Security Act and Relief (1936) 4 U. of Chi. Law
Rev. 45, 55-56; National Industrial Conference Board, Unemployment Insur-
ance, Lessons from British Experience (1934).
6. Douglas and Director, The Problem of Unemployment (1931) 427-463.
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such laws in effect. 7 In the United States, on the other hand,
such schemes as had been devised until the recent movement
were voluntary and restricted in their application.8 At the start
of the depression it has been estimated that they embraced not
more than 150,000 workers.9
Unemployment compensation does not solve0 the problem of
unemployment, although it is hoped that the actuarial data which
will result from it will be helpful in reaching a solution. It is a
device which aims at alleviating the evils of unemployment by
building up reserves during good times through taxes on em-
ployment in order to tide the worker over periods of unemploy-
ment by the payment of benefits, in proportion to wages formerly
received, from the funds which have been accumulated. The re-
stricted scope of plans", presently proposed invalidates any hope
that they will provide a cure for such acute situations as the
present. On the other hand, they will provide immediate relief
to those who qualify under them, acting as a cushion against the
effects of depression as manifested in reduced purchasing power
and the sudden thrusting of the unemployed into the arms of
private or governmental charity. More important is the possi-
bility that they will provide the root from which a more com-
prehensive system may evolve.' 2
The first compulsory plan in the United States was the Wis-
consin Act." Prior to that time there had been numerous in-
7. Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, and Norway; also, many of the cantons of Switzerland.
8. Such plans as existed before the advent of compulsory laws were of
three varieties: (1) Union Benefit Plans, sponsored by trade unions; (2)
Employers' Plans, sponsored by business concerns; (3) plans sponsored by
employers and unions jointly. For a discussion of these, see Douglas and
Director, The Problem of Unemployment (1931) 464-480.
9. It is estimated by Douglas and Director that the Union Plans em-
braced approximately 34,700 workers; Employers' Plans, 47,000; Joint
Plans, 69,500. See pp. 482-483.
10. After twenty-five years of unemployment compensation in Great Bri-
tain, the problem of unemployment is far from solved. See Beveridge, Un-
employment: A Problem of Industry (1930) 418-420; Beveridge, Causes and
Cures of Unemployment (1931) 53-59.
11. The state acts so far enacted provide for compensation only for a
limited period of time; they specifically except the workers in certain occu-
pations and do not cover all workers within those occupations covered by
the act.
12. For an account of the extensions of the British system, originally
covering only 2,000,000 workers, to include more and more occupations and
employees, see references cited in supra, note 5.
13. Wis. L. 1931, c. 20, as amended; L. 1933, cc. 186, 383; L. 1935, cc. 192,
272, 446.
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vestigations and attempts at passage of legislation,14 all of which
had resulted in failure. The Federal Social Security Act was
enacted into law on August 14, 1935, and it is this which has
given to the movement the impetus which has resulted in the
passage of acts in thirty-six states and the District of Colum-
bia.15
The Federal Act does not in itself impose an insurance sys-
tem.1 6 But through a uniform tax' 7 upon employers of eight or
14. The first unemployment insurance bill was introduced in the Massa-
chusetts Legislature in 1916. Prior to the passage of the Wisconsin Act,
bills had been introduced in seventeen states. Resolutions for investigation
of the problem of unemployment were introduced in Congress in 1916 and
1928. State Commissions studied the subject in California, Connecticut, Illi-
nois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, and Virginia.
15. The following are the acts passed up to Jan. 1, 1937: Alabama, Laws
1935, c. 447, as amended by Laws 1936, cc. 156, 194, 195; Arizona, S. B.
No. 3, Special Session of 1935 Leg.; California, Stat. 1935, c. 352; Colorado,
H. B. No. 1, c. 2, 3rd Special Session of 1935 Leg.; Connecticut, S. B. No. 5,
c. 2, 1st Special Session of 1935 Leg.; District of Columbia, Public No.
386, 74th Congress, 1st Session, as amended (1935); Idaho, Id. Laws
1936, c. 12, 3rd Special Session of 23rd Leg.; Indiana, Ind. Acts, 1936,
c. 4; Iowa, S. B. No. 1, 1st Special Session, 1936 Leg.; Kentucky, H. B.
No. 1, Special Session, 1936; Louisiana, La. Laws 1936, H. B. No. 82;
Maine, H. B. No. 1883, 1st Special Session of 1935 Leg.; Maryland, H. B.
No. 1, c. 1, 2d Special Session of 1935 Leg.; Massachusetts, Laws 1935,
c. 479; Laws 1936, cc. 12, 249; Michigan, H. B. No. 1, 1st Special Ses-
sion, 1936 Leg.; Minnesota, H. B. No. 11, c. 2, 2d Special Session, 1936;
Mississippi, Miss. Laws, 1936, H. B. No. 310, c. 176; New Hampshire,
N. H. Laws 1935, cc. 99, 142; Laws 1936, c. 3; New Jersey, Ass. Bill
No. 1, c. 270, 1st Special Session, 1936 Leg.; New Mexico, H. B. No.
1, 1st Special Session of 1936 Leg.; New York, N. Y. Laws, 1935, c.
468; Laws 1936, cc. 117, 697; North Carolina, H. B. No. 1, 1st Special
Session of 1936 Leg.; Ohio, H. B. No. 608, 1st Special Session of 1935
Leg.; Oklahoma, H. B. No. 1, 1st Special Session of 1935 Leg.; Oregon,
Ore. Laws 1935, c. 70; Pennsylvania, H. B. No. 1, 2d Special Session
of 1935 Leg.; Rhode Island, R. I. Laws 1936, c. 2333; South Carolina,
S. C. Laws 1936, Act. No. 768; South Dakota, S. B. No. 1, Special
Session, 1936; Tennessee, H. B. No. 1, 2d Special Session of 1935 Leg.;
Texas, S. B. No. 5, 3rd Special Session of 1935 Leg.; Utah, Utah Laws 1935,
as repealed by H. B. No. 2, Laws of 1936; Vermont, H. B. No. 1, 2d Special
Session, 1936; Virginia, S. B. No. 1-X, 1st Special Session of 1936 Leg.;
Washington, Wash. Laws 1935, c. 145. West Virginia, H. B. No. 1, 2d
Special Session of 1936 Leg.; Wisconsin, Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20 as amended;
Laws 1933, cc. 186, 383; Laws 1935, cc. 192, 272, 446.
The Washington act was declared unconstitutional by the Washington
Supreme Court because of a technical mistake in the wording of the act.
Johnson v. State, 60 P. (2d) 681 (1936). For constitutionality of Alabama
statute see note 44, infra.
For pending acts see Commerce Clearing House Unemployment Insur-
ance Service. For recommendations for a Missouri act see St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Dec. 28, 1936, p. 1: 4.
16. The considerations probably responsible for the Federal Act imposing
no Federal system are: (1) constitutional difficulties; (2) administrative
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more workers in all except specifically excepted occupations, 8
against which may be credited 9 payments into approved state
unemployment funds up to 90% of the amount of the Federal
tax, the necessary stimulus has been provided.
State acts must meet certain basic requirements20 before ap-
proval can be given to them by the Social Security Board and
certain suggestions for state legislation have been issued by the
Board,2 1 but wide latitude is in fact accorded to state legislatures
in the framing of their acts. Those already enacted differ in de-
tails, although they may be considered as falling into three gen-
eral groups: the employer-reserve type of law,22 the pooled sys-
tem with merit-rating,23 and the straight pooled system.24 Some
state acts in addition provide for guaranteed-employment sys-
tems.25
In more than half the state acts compulsory contributions are
made by employers alone. In the others employees as well con-
tribute, although at a lower rate.26 Conspicuous is the absence of
difficulties; (3) political theory, that the states should be allowed to experi-
ment with their own plans. Many state acts, however, contain clauses mak-
ing their operation contingent on constitutionality of the Federal Act.
17. Social Security Act, sec. 901. See note 80, infra. This tax was felt
necessary to overcome the reluctance of states to pass laws because of
fear that employers within their borders would be put at a competitive dis-
advantage with employers in other states.
18. Ibid., sec. 907. See note 85, infra.
19. Ibid., sees. 902, 909, 910. See infra, notes 81 and 82.
20. Ibid., secs. 303, 903. See infra, notes 79 and 83.
21. See Social Security Board's Draft Bills for State Unemployment Com-
pensation of Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account Types (1936).
22. The Wisconsin law, cited in supra, note 15, is an example of the em-
ployer reserve type. Under this type of law special accounts are maintained
for each employer out of which contributions are paid to those in his em-
ploy who subsequently become unemployed. The Indiana and Kentucky laws
combine characteristics of this and the pool type. The Vermont law gives
the employer the option of establishing a separate reserve account or joining
a state pooled fund. Utah, which originally had an employer reserve plan,
has now changed to the pooled fund type. For discussion, see Brandeis, The
Employer-Reserve Type of Unemployment Compensation Law (1936) 3 Law
and Contemp. Prob. 54.
23. This is the most common type of law. Under it contributions are
pooled into a state fund, out of which all benefits are paid. Individual em-
ployer accounts are kept for purposes of merit-rating (see infra, note 30).
See Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Merit Rating (1936) 3 Law and Con-
temp. Prob. 65.
24. The Maine, Mississippi, New York, N. Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, S. Dakota, and Virginia laws set up no plans for merit-rating.
25. California, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin treat
specially employers guaranteeing employment. The Federal Social Security
Act provides for guaranteed-employment accounts in sec. 910 (c).
26. The general provision where contributions by employees are con-
templated is that they shall contribute one-half of the amount due from
NOTES19371
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state contributions, one of the features of the British system. 27
Payments are assessed at a fixed percentage28 of the total pay-
rolls of employers affected,29 although adjustments-° on the basis
of the employer's employment record may be made and are pro-
vided for in the Federal Act.31
Benefits are payable to unemployed who have been employed
a required number of weeks2 2 during a stipulated preceding pe-
riod,33 have been unemployed for a designated period of time
denominated a "waiting period,' ' 4 are available for work, and are
not subject to certain disqualifications. 5 These benefits are as-
their employers. See Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation law, sec.
3(b).
27. In Great Britain the state has been called upon to contribute about
one-third or a little less. In the United States there are contributions from
the Federal Government through grants-in-aid (Social Security Act, secs.
301-303), but no state acts provide for state contributions.
28. The state acts generally follow the tax provisions of the federal act
in the assessment of contributions: for the first year, 1% or 0.9%; for the
second year, 2% or 1.8%; for the third year and thereafter, except as
affected by merit-rating, 3% or 2.7%.
29. Most state acts except those employers excepted by see. 907 of the
Social Security Act (see infra, note 80). Coverage is also limited by provi-
sions which make the act applicable only to employers of a certain number
of employees: e. g., Oklahoma, 8 or more; Connecticut, 5 or more; New
York, 4 or more. The District of Columbia, Idaho, and Pennsylvania acts
provide for contributions of employers of one or more.
30. Some states, like Massachusetts, provide for a commission to adjust
rates on the basis of employment records. Others set up a definite mathe-
matical formula by which rates are adjusted after the employer's contri-
butions over and above the amount of benefits paid out have reached a
certain percentage of his annual payroll. The Oklahoma Act, e. g., pro-
vides for a reduction from 2.7% to 1.8% when this percentage has reached
7.5%; when it has passed 10%, there is a further reduction to 0.9%. Pro-
vision also is made for increase of contribution rate to 3.6% if benefits for
a certain period exceed contributions. Some states provide for a complete
release from payments on the basis of employment records: e. g., Indiana.
31. Social Security Act, secs. 909 and 910.
32. State provisions vary. Generally they follow the Federal Draft Act,
which provides for payments to a person who has had at least 13 weeks of
employment during the year preceding unemployment. Fed. Draft Act, sec.
4 (c). Some states require as much as 26 weeks, e. g., California and Oregon.
33. During a year or two years.
34. Generally, two or three weeks. The Washington act requires six
weeks. Workers are not charged with more than one waiting period during
a single year.
35. Certain acts of the employee will disqualify him under the unem-
ployment compensation acts altogether or will result in adding to the wait-
ing period and reducing the duration of benefits. Under the Massachusetts
act, e. g., disqualifications enumerated include: discharge for misconduct,
labor dispute, voluntary leaving, refusal of suitable employment, unemploy-
ment by reason of commitment to a penal institution, wilful failure to give
correct amount of earnings when filing claim. If the applicant for com-
pensation is receiving benefits under Workmen's Compensation, he is dis-
qualified except as to the amount by which unemployment benefits may
exceed his Workmen's Compensation benefits.
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sessed at a rate approximately 50% of the average full-time
wages received by the claimant, with maximum and minimum
limits as to amount.3 6 To date few of the acts include provisions
for adjustment on the basis of need of the recipient.3 7 Benefits,
once they become payable, continue for a definite number of
weeks,-" at the end of which time the employee, if he has not
found work elsewhere, is thrust back upon other forms of relief.
An important element of the acts is the establishment of employ-
ment bureaus for the purpose of securing re-employment.
The legislation has been greeted with a great deal of comment
and criticism. There are obstacles which may prevent it from
becoming established in its present form at the present time, but
even if this is so it is important as evidencing popular recogni-
tion of the need for a more systematic handling of the intense
unemployment problem. One such obstacle is presented by the
procedural requirements 9 of certain state constitutions. Most
36. Most acts require that benefits shall not exceed $15 per week. Nor
shall benefits be less than a certain amount, e. g., $5 (Mass.), $7 (Cal.), $8
or three-quarters of the weekly full-time wage whichever is the lesser
(Okla.).
37. The District of Columbia act provides for benefits to 40% of the
claimant's prior wages, with additions of 10% for a dependent spouse, 5%
for each dependent relative, to a maximum of 65% or $15.
38. Most acts provide for a duration of one-fourth of a week for each
week of employment during the preceding two years, with, however, a
maximum of about twelve weeks of compensation within a year.
39. In Missouri possible obstacles to the enactment of an unemployment
compensation law may be met in sections 15 and 19 of article X of the
Missouri Constitution. Section 15 requires the State Treasurer to deposit
all funds in the treasury "in such bank or banks as he may, from time to
time, with the approval of the Governor and the Attorney-General, select,
the said bank or banks giving security, satisfactory to the Governor and
the Attorney-General, for the safe-keeping and payment of such deposit
when demanded ..... " The Social Security Act requires, by Section 904(a),
deposit "directly with the Secretary of the Treasury or with any Federal
reserve bank or member of the Federal Reserve System designated by him
for such purpose." California (Article XI, Section 161/) has in its Con-
stitution a similar provision to Missouri's, (although it does not require
security) and the California Court has held in Gillum v. Johnson, 4 U. S.
Law Week 420 (Cal., 1936), that the California Act was not unconstitu-
tional on this ground, saying, "Since the state act has been approved by the
proper federal authority, it must be assumed that such approval carried
with it an approval of the state act as it could operate in this state and
that some national bank or banks in this state would be designated for
the deposit of the state unemployment funds."
Section 19 requires that "No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury
of this State, or any of the funds under its management, except in pur-
suance of an appropriation by law. . . 2" Such a provision should not be
allowed to prevent the payments from "special funds" without specific
appropriations. A similar New York provision, (New York Const., Art. III,
see. 21) has been so construed. Kings County Lighting Co. v. Maltbie, 280
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inportant are difficulties which may be encountered by the state
and federal acts under the United States Constitution.
II
Fear "that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional
the state unemployment insurance acts thus far enacted has been
in large part allayed by the recent action of the Court in affirm-
ing without opinion,40 by a 4 to 4 vote, the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals in Chamberlain v. Andrews,41 holding
constitutional the New York State Act.42 Mr. Justice Stone did
not participate in the decision, but it is felt that, had he been on
the bench, he would have voted in favor of the act's constitu-
tionality. The inference from the Court's action is that other
state acts will likewise be sustained, since the New York Act is
one of the most liberal of the acts passed.-3 It is auspicious that
the decision came before other courts, which might be inclined
to stricter constitutional interpretation than the New York
Court, had had a chance to rule on other state acts, although
despite the Supreme Court's action the United States District
Court in Alabama recently declared the Alabama State Act un-
constitutional.4 4 In California and Massachusetts, on the other
hand, the state supreme courts have held the state acts consti-
tutional .4
There seems to be little justification for considering the con-
stitutional issues involved in these state laws from the stand-
point of their validity as taxing measures. 4 In their general
N. Y. Supp. 560 (1935). But in Missouri the holdings are not so clear.
Ex parte Lucas, 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218 (1901), however, indicates a
similar result, allowing a State Board of Examiners to collect license fees,
retain them, and disburse them. See also, State ex rel. v. Thompson, 305
Mo. 57, 264 S. W. 598 (1924).
40. 4 U. S. Law Week 301 (1936).
41. 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936). See Comments, 5 Fordham L.
Rev. 499 (1936); 31 II. L. Rev. 386 (1936); 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 95
(1936).
42. New York Labor Law, sec. 500 et seq.; N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 468, as
amended.
43. No merit-rating system is set up by the New York Act. See supra,
note 30.
44. Gulf States Paper Co. v. Carmichael, So. Coal & Coke Co. v. Car-
michael, 4 U. S. Law Week 450 (D. C. D. Ala., Dec. 15, 1936).
45. California: Gillum v. Johnson, 4 U. S. Law Week 420 (1936); Massa-
chusetts: Howes Bros. Co. v. U. C. C. (1936).
46. See Rice, A Note on the Constitutionality of State Unemployment
Compensation Laws (1936) 3 Law & Contemp. Prob. 138, 139-142. For con-
stitutional issues which might arise were the contributions considered as
taxes, see Epstein and Malisoff, Some Constitutional Obstacles to Unem-
ployment Insurance (1935) 9 Social Security, No. 9, p. 3.
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nature they resemble the workmen's compensation acts,47 the
constitutionality of which the courts have regarded as dependent
upon their validity as exercises of the states' police power.48 The
majority of the New York Court of Appeals took the view that
it was immaterial whether the measure should be considered as
embodying a tax or an exercise of the police power,49 but the
dissenting justices plainly considered it as the latter50 The Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts, and Alabama Federal Courts have con-
sidered similar acts as exercises of the police power.21 Further-
more, there are provisions in the state acts which are patently
inconsistent with those of the usual taxing measures.2  The im-
portant constitutional issues therefore center in the applicability
of limitations in the Fourteenth Amendment to the state unem-
ployment insurance acts as exercises of the police power of the
states.
Compulsory unemployment insurance was thought by many to
be legislation beyond the scope of the police power. While this
power justifies the enactment of measures reasonably related to
great public needs, 53 the courts have seen fit to lay down limi-
tations upon the exercises of the legislatures' powers. 4 Thus a
measure will not be sustained which involves "a palpable inva-
sion of rights secured by fundamental law."' 5 Nor will it be
sanctioned where the courts can say that its object is not legiti-
47. Like the Workmen's Compensation Acts, the Unemployment Insur-
ance Acts impose a new liability upon employers and shift a new risk to
business, for the protection of employees. Both are mechanically similar,
involving contributions to a state fund and the payment of benefits there-
from.
48. The constitutional aspects have been considered as if they were exer-
cises of the police power. See Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S.
219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685 (1917) ; New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243
U. S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed. 667 (1917). In Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I.
484, 96 Atl. 343 (1916), the court refused to consider cases having to do
with taxes.
49. 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 26. The court found that the power to enact such
legislation necessarily existed in the state; hence, it was unnecessary to
decide whether it was an exercise of the taxing or of the police power.
50. 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 30.
51. Supra, notes 44 and 45.
52. The acts are not in the form of revenue measures; merit-rating is
inconsistent with the provisions of a taxing statute; funds are limited to
payment of benefit claims; penalties inconsistent with taxes are prescribed.
53. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 S. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed.
112 (1911).
54. See Brown, Due Process, Police Power, and the Supreme Court(1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 943, 953; Powell, The Supreme Court and State
Police Power, 1922-1930 (1932) 18 Va. L. Rev. 597.
55. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. ed. 205(1887).
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mate, as where it unduly restricts liberty to engage in a lawful
business. 6 Legislation, furthermore, must be reasonably related
to a legitimate object and not arbitrary. The Supreme Court re-
fused to sustain a state act requiring partners and members of
corporations owning drug stores to be licensed pharmacists be-
cause it did not bear a reasonable relation to the legitimate ob-
ject of safeguarding the public health.5 7 Legislation has been
sustained where it imposed limitations of working hours upon
workmen in mines and smelteries 6 and upon women workers in
certain occupations59 and where it regulated hours and payment
for overtime work,60 but the court has refused to find in mini-
mum wage legislation a reasonable exercise of the police power.0 1
In the Supreme Court's attitude on the minimum wage cases
cited above there was ground for belief that compulsory unem-
ployment compensation would be declared unconstitutional as
arbitrary legislation which deprived employers of their property
without due process. It should be noted, however, that in the
minimum wage cases the court was concerned with the legisla-
tion's result of depriving employers and employees of the right
to bargain as to wage scales.0 2 In the unemployment insurance
laws there is no such consequence and there is ample authority
to sanction the sustaining of such acts. The decision in the Rail-
road Retirement case,6 3 where the Federal act64 in question bore
some resemblance to the state unemployment insurance laws, is
not in point because of the absence of police power in the Federal
Government outside the field of interstate commerce.0 5 State
56. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 S. Ct. 662, 61 L. ed. 1336 (1917).
57. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57, 73 L. ed. 204
(1928).
58. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 S. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780 (1898).
59. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324, 52 L. ed. 551 (1908).
60. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 S. Ct. 435, 61 L. ed. 830 (1917).
61. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed.
785 (1923) ; People ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead, 298 U. S. 587, 56 S. Ct. 918
(1936). The U. S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the
Washington Supreme Court's action in sustaining a Washington minimum
wage law. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 57 S. Ct. 40 (1936). The U. S.
District Court for So. District Ohio recently upheld an Ohio minimum wage
law. Walker v. Chapman, 4 U. S. Law Week 332 (1936).
62. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed.
785 (1923).
63. R. R. Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct.
758, 79 L. ed. 1458 (1935), holding unconstitutional the Federal Act.
64. 48 Stat. 1283, 45 U. S. C. A. see. 201 et seq. (1934). The act estab-
lished a compulsory retirement system for employees of all railroad carriers
in interstate commerce. Through the compulsory contributions from the
carriers a fund was to be provided for the payment of pensions.
65. See 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 26-27.
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legislation has been sustained where exactions were required
which were supported by an ulterior public advantage and char-
acterized by a sharing in a scheme of mutual benefits, such as
the establishment of a depositors' guaranty fund.6 6 Most con-
vincing is the authority of the compulsory workmen's compensa-
tion acts, where the courts have recognized that accidents are
foreseeable consequences of the employment relation67 and that
exactions for the purpose of providing payments under them are
reasonable exercises of the police power.68 Although unemploy-
ment is caused by factors in large part beyond the employer's
control, still it is a consequence of the employer-employee rela-
tionship which might reasonably be charged as a cost upon in-
dustry. ,
Merit-rating provisions in most state acts provide for reward-
ing employers with good employment records by lower contribu-
tion rates,70 thus reducing the effectiveness of the argument that
the acts are arbitrary schemes by which employers with good
records will carry the burden, 1' although in the New York Act,
sustained by the Supreme Court, no such provision is included.
That the acts are unconstitutional because of arbitrary classifica-
tion in that they are applicable only to employers of a specified
number of employees72 and that they are not applicable to certain
excepted occupations are objections which do not involve the
principle of the acts and could be overcome by amendment. How-
ever, if the classification is based on a principle which bears a
reasonable relation to some legitimate object and if the law pre-
sumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be over-
thrown because there are other instances where it might have
66. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104.
67. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219.68. New York C. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188.
69. Mr. Justice Holmes, concurring, in the Arizona Employers' Liability
Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 433, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed. 1058 (1919), suggested
with regard to the Employers' Liability Acts in question that, "It is reason-
able that the public should pay the whole cost of producing what it wants
and a part of that cost is the pain and mutilation incident to production.
By throwing the loss upon the employer in the first instance we throw it
upon the public in the long run and that is just." Might not this reasoning
be extended to include suffering and hardship from unemployment?
70. Supra, note 30.
71. See Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Carmichael, 4 U. S. Law Week 450.
72. See case cited supra, note 71. The court there suggested possible
unfair competitive conditions in the same industry between employers of
seven or less employees and those of eight or more because of higher costs
in the latter due to the Alabama Act's applying only to employers of eight
or more. But the same considerations are presented by the New York law,
applying to employers of four or more, sustained by the Supreme Court.
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been applied.73 To be unconstitutional, classification must pro-
duce unreasonable and arbitrary inequality.
74
III
More difficult problems of constitutionality are presented by
the unemployment compensation sections of the Federal Social
Security Act. These sections are Title III17 providing for grants
to states for unemployment compensation administration, and
Title IX,76 providing for a tax to be levied on employers of eight
or more and for certain credits to be allowed against that tax.
There is little doubt as to the constitutional validity of the
provisions of Title III. This part of the Act is modelled after the
Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act,7 7 providing for similar gTants-
in-aid, sustained by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts V.
Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon.7 Under it the grants are
conditioned upon the state acts' including certain general char-
acteristics"9 which are not dissimilar from the requirements of
the Maternity Act.
Title IX of the Act provides for a tax 0 on employers of eight
or more with provisions for credit8' against the tax of the amount
73. Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 44 S. Ct. 325, 68 L. ed. 690
(1924), citing Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 34 S. Ct. 856,
58 L. ed. 1288 (1914).
74. Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 325, 22 S. Ct.
662, 46 L. ed. 922 (1902).
75. Social Security Act, secs. 301-303.
76. Ibid., secs. 901-910.
77. 42 Stat. 224, 42 U. S. C. A. sec. 161 (1921).
78. 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1922). It was held in this case that
neither the state nor a taxpayer could challenge the validity of the Act
since, the state being under no obligation to accept the federal offer, it had
suffered no violation of any right, and since the citizen's interest in the
general funds of the Treasury was too minute and indeterminable to furnish
a basis for challenge of the use of such funds.
79. Social Security Act, sec. 303, provides: Acts must be approved by the
Social Security Board and include provisions which assure adequate meth-
ods of administration; payment of benefits through public employment
offices; opportunity for fair hearing and trial for disappointed claimants;
payment of receipts to Unemployment Trust Fund of the Treasury; ex-
penditure of all money drawn out of the Fund by the State in the payment
of unemployment compensation; the making of reports to the Social Security
Board; availability of information on recipients of compensation to other
agencies of the United States.
80. Ibid, sec. 901. Taxes are levied upon employers with respect to hav-
ing individuals in their employ equal to percentages of the total wages
payable by him as follows: (1) 1% during the year 1936; (2) 2% during
the year 1937; (3) 3% after Dec. 31, 1937.
81. Ibid., sec. 902. "The taxpayer may credit against the tax . . . the
amount of contributions, with respect to employment during the taxable
year, paid by him.., into an unemployment fund under a State law. The
total credit allowed to a taxpayer under this section for all contributions
paid into unemployment funds . . . shall not exceed 90 per centum of the
tax against which it is credited .... "
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of contributions, with respect to employment, paid into an unem-
ployment fund under a state law, up to 90% of the tax against
which they are credited. Certain additional credit is provided
for in other sections of the Act,8 2 so that consideration may be
given to state acts containing provisions for reduction in contri-
butions of employers with acceptable employment records. Con-
ditions are given for the approval of state laws.83 An unem-
ployment trust fund is created ;84 and the term "employment" as
used in the Act is qualified. 85
The provisions for credit against the Federal tax are obviously
aimed at encouragement, if not compulsion, of the passage by
the states of unemployment compensation acts. A similar plan
was used in the Revenue Act of 192686 where a credit was al-
lowed against the Federal inheritance tax of amounts paid under
state acts, not to exceed 80% of the Federal tax. This provision
was held constitutional in Florid v. Mellon. 7 There was no ques-
82. Ibid., secs. 909 and 910.
83. Ibid., sec. 903. State laws must provide that: (1) all compensation is
to be paid through public employment offices in the State or such other
agencies as the Board may approve; (2) No compensation shall be payable
with respect to any day of unemployment occurring within two years after
the first day of the first period with respect to which contributions are re-
quired; (3) all money received in the unemployment fund shall immediately,
upon such receipt be paid over to the Secretary of the Treasury to the
credit of the Unemployment Trust Fund; (4) All money withdrawn from
the Unemployment Trust Fund by the State Agency shall be used solely in
the payment of compensation, exclusive of expenses of administration; (5)
Compensation shall not be denied in such State to any otherwise eligible
individual for refusing to accept new work under certain specified condi-
tions . . .; (6) All the rights, privileges, or immunities conferred by such
law or by acts pursuant thereto shall exist subject to the power of the
legislature to amend or repeal such law at any time.
84. Ibid., sec. 904.
85. Ibid., sec. 907 (c) "The Term means any service performed within
the United States by an employee for his employer, except-(1) Agricul-
tural labor, (2) Domestic service in a private home, (3) Service performed
as an officer or member of the crew of a vessel on the navigable waters of
the United States; (4) Service performed by an individual in the employ
of his son, daughter, or spouse, and service performed by a child under the
age of twenty-one in the employ of his father or mother; (5) Service per-
formed in the employ of the United States Government or of an instrumen-
tality of the United States; (6) Service performed in the employ of a state,
a political subdivision thereof, or an instrumentality of one or more states
or political subdivisions; (7) Service performed in the employ of a corpora-
tion, community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes,
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which enures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual."
86. 44 Stat. 9, 69, 70, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 413 (1926).
87. 273 U. S. 12, 47 S. Ct. 265, 71 L. ed. 511 (1927).
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tion in that case of the constitutionality of the taxing measure
itself, but its relevancy in the present issue is that it indicates
that the tax, if otherwise constitutional, will not be invalidated
because of the provisions for credit.
Fatal defects must be found elsewhere if they in fact exist. It
is under the taxing power of Congress 8 that the unemployment
insurance sections of the Social Security Act must stand or fall.
In many decisions the Supreme Court has sustained taxes which
in their practical effect have amounted to regulations. Among
those sustained were: a tax upon the circulating notes of state
banks ;89 a tax on oleomargarine ;90 the Harrison Narcotic Drug
Act, imposing a tax on the manufacture, importation, sale, or
gift of narcotics.91 In the latter case four justices dissented on
the ground that the statute was a mere attempt by Congress to
exert a power reserved to the states.2 Shortly after the decision
was handed down the Court ruled unconstitutional the taxes con-
tested in the Child Labor Tax Case9" and in Hill v. Wallace 4 on
the ground that the taxes were not for the purpose of raising
revenue, but that they showed on their face that they were regu-
latory measures, attempts under the guise of the taxing power
to. accomplish something not reasonably related to the raising of
revenue.
In the A. A. A. case"9 the Court said, in declaring unconstitu-
tional the processing tax in the Agricultural Adjustment Act,99
that an "exaction cannot be wrested out of its setting, denomi-
nated an excise for raising revenue and legalized by ignoring its
purpose as a mere instrumentality for bringing about a desired
end.''97 The Court consequently looked at the purpose of the
88. U. S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.
89. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869).
90. McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78 (1904).
91. U. S. v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214, 63 L. ed. 493 (1919).
92. Chief Justice White, Justices McKenna, Van DeVanter, and McRey-
nolds. 249 U. S. 86, 95 (1919).
93. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed.
817 (1922), where the act in question imposed a tax on employers who em-
ployed children under a certain age.
94. 259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922), where the act in
question imposed a tax upon all contracts for the sale of grain for future
delivery except sales on Boards of Trade designated by the Secretary of
Agriculture upon fulfillment by such boards of certain requirements set
forth in the act.
95. U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. 287 (1935).
96. 48 Stat. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 601 et seq. (1933).
97. 297 U. S. 1, 61. In U. S. v. Doremus, supra, note 91, the Court had
said that it could not hold, with regard to the Harrison Act, that Congress
could not find the regulations necessary in order to prevent evasion of the
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whole Act, which it found to be the regulation of agricultural
production; it found that the tax was a mere incident of the
regulation; and that since the regulation was beyond the power
of Congress as limited by the Tenth Amendment,5 the tax was
unconstitutional.
There can be little doubt that if the Court wishes the language
of the A. A. A. case can be stretched to include the exaction
under the Social Security Act with the result that it could be
held to be a measure primarily regulatory and not sufficiently
connected with the raising of revenue. Among the features of
the Act which the Court would cite to support such a conclusion
would be: the true purpose of the Act as reflected in its title9
and in the intentions of its framers; 10 regulatory provisions
which the Court could find were not reasonably related to the
raising of revenue and hence an unwarranted attempt to accom-
plish indirectly, through taxing and spending, what Congress
could not achieve by more direct means. Among such provisions
undoubtedly would be included the credit allowed to taxpayers
in states enacting approved unemployment compensation acts'01
and the necessity of approval of state acts by the Social Security
Board as a condition of credits against the Federal tax.10 2 The
Court could find that these provisions are an attempt to set up a
system of unemployment insurance under the taxing power, and
thus to inject the Federal Government into a field which it could
not enter by more direct means since unemployment insurance
is a matter of state concern, reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment.'0 3
On the other hand there are obvious differences between the
tax and to assist in raising revenue, although the revenue there was purely
incidental to the regulatory purposes of the Act.
98. U. S. Constitution, Art. X: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively or to the people."
99. "An Act: To provide for the general welfare by establishing a sys-
tem of Federal old-age benefits and by enabling the several States to make
more adequate provisions for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and
crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the ad-
ministration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a
Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes." The
mention of revenue appears from the wording of the title to be secondary.
100. 79 Cong. Rec. 5468 (1935).
101. Supra, notes 79 and 83.
102. Supra, notes 81 and 82.
103. See Denby, The Case Against the Constitutionality of the Social
Security Act (1936) 3 Law & Contemp. Prob. 315; Armstrong, The Federal
Social Security Act and Its Constitutional Aspects (1936) 24 Cal. L. Rev.
247.
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tax in the Social Security Act and the taxes in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the Child Labor Tax Act, and the Grain Ex-
change Tax Act, which would justify the Court in holding it a
constitutional use of the taxing power. First is the general truth
that unemployment relief is a field which the Federal Govern-
ment has already entered and from which it cannot, without
great difficulty, withdraw.10 4 Then there are certain differences
in the provisions of the Act itself. Among these are the sub-
stantial revenue which will go into the general Treasury' over
and above the credit extended to employers in states which have
approved regulation and the absence of detailed regulation of
individual producers which characterized the A. A. A."00 Under
the Social Security Act these regulations are left to the states.
All that is required is conformity to a minimum of Federal re-
quirements.
IV
At the time of this writing there has been but one Federal
decision on the constitutionality of the Federal Act. In Davis v.
Boston & Maine R. R.20 7 the Federal Act was declared by the
United States District Court in Boston to be a proper exercise
of the taxing power. A Supreme Court decision will, of course,
be needed 08 before the validity of the Act is finally settled. Cer-
tain general conclusions, however, may be stated. If the Act is
declared unconstitutional some other means must be devised for
dealing with such a vital and continuing problem. If it is ruled
constitutional, the Act will be a landmark in American legisla-
tion. For here is a means by which the Federal Government can
force the states to act in fields where it could not act directly,
subject, of course, to the limitations in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
JAMES H. WuAR, Jn.
104. During the depression Federal aid was extended to the unemployed
not only through direct grants of money, but through such emergency
agencies as the C. C. C., W. P. A., P. W. A., F. E. R. A., etc. In the regula-
tions attempted in the acts questioned in the A. A. A. case, the Child Labor
case, and Hill v. Wallace, the Federal Government had no such established
interest.
105. 10% of the tax is to be collected from employers under all circum-
stances.
106. Under the Social Security Act the detailed regulations are left to
the states. Only general requirements of state acts are specified. See supra,
notes 79 and 83. In the A. A. A. the most minute details of planned crop
reduction, marketing agreements, issuance of licenses, etc., were left to the
Secretary of Agriculture. See 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 601 et seq.
107. 4 U. S. Law Week 416 (1936).
108. 4 U. S. Law Week 429 (1936). Cert. denied Jan. 4, 1937.
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